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INTRODUCTION
Any study of labor policy and defense contracts must start with one fundamental
fact: the mission of the Department of Defense-the agency that lets the contracts
and thus wields whatever economic power the government as customer may possess-
is neither labor policy nor contracting. The student of labor policy and defense
contracts must begin his analysis, and draw his conclusions, with a full appreciation
of this foundation. The mission of the Department of Defense underlies and ex-
plains the procedures and practices that are followed. Conclusive and ubiquitous is
its influence.
As with all departments and agencies, the Department of Defense of course
adheres to the fundamental policies of the government. Established policy applies
alike throughout.
The basic labor policy of our government, of our country, is freedom. We are
dedicated to a free enterprise system. Equally are we dedicated to free labor. For
relations between labor and management, free collective bargaining is the watchword.
The Wagner Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin Acts,' has
firmly rooted free collective bargaining in our national life.
Free labor and free management have worked with the Department of Defense
to make our nation strong and secure. Their accomplishments have been enormous.
If our modern weapons systems appear the conception of science fiction writers, let
us not forget that these remarkable scientific achievements have been produced by
free labor and free management. Production of one modern missile may involve
the manufacture and assembly of a quarter million parts. Construction of a missile
site may mean the handling of thousands of tons of materials. Add to these quantita-
tive indices the closest of tolerances and the tightest of specifications, all within a
pressing time demand, and the beginnings of appreciating the contribution of free
labor and management to our defense posture emerge.
Formulation of labor policy is distinctly a civilian concern. Ours is a nation
of civilian, not military control. That labor policy is beyond the stated jurisdiction
of the Department of Defense is understandable on this score alone.
Labor policy also lies beyond the assigned concern of the other government
agencies, which are civilian, that engage in the contracting process. For them too,
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contracting-procurement-is not the mission but simply a means by which it is
fulfilled.2
As a result, a review of labor policy and defense contracts will largely serve the
same purposes as one including all government contracts. Defense contracts, more-
over, constitute a particularly good model. They cover a wide range of goods and
services, from shoes to missiles, from building maintenance to elaborate research.8
They constitute the major part of all government procurement. And they have
formed the basis of most of the history that facilitates understanding of labor policy
and government contracts.
The mission of the Department of Defense is the defense of the nation No
more, no less. Contracting is one means by which that mission is fulfilled. It is not
the sole means; neither, of course, is it an unimportant or insignificant one. Labor
policy is one aspect of contracting. It, again, is neither the sole nor an unimportant
or insignificant aspect.
Labor policy is the mission of other government agencies. The Department of
Labor is, plainly, the paramount arm of government for labor policyY The Secre-
tary of Labor is the chief adviser to the President on labor matters. Within that
overall framework, other agencies perform specific missions of labor policy. The
National Labor Relations Board patrols the relationships between labor and manage-
ment, employees and unions, in interpreting and enforcing the Taft-Hartley Act.
When the labor-management relationship strains, when disputes develop, the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service stands ready with mediatory assistance to
parties whose relations are governed by Taft-Harley.6 The National Mediation
Board is similarly available to parties subject to the Railway Labor Act.7
'Two agencies of government other than the Defense Department procure more than $1 billion
annually. One, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), was organized to provide
the expansion of human knowledge, improvement of aeronautical and space vehicles, long range studies,
and the like. 42 U.S.C. § 2451(c) (1958). The other, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), was
established to provide for the promotion of research and development; control of information; control
of the possession, use and production of atomic energy and special nuclear material; international co-
operation, and so forth, all to the end of stimulating scientific and industrial progress and furthering
national defense, security, and welfare. 68 Stat. 922 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2013 (1958). The General
Services Administration does function as the general purchasing agent for the government and, as such,
might be considered to have procurement as its mission. However, the General Services Administration
also furnishes services to other government agencies with its own work force and without contract. In
addition, the Administrator is required to act "in respect of executive agencies.., and with due regard
to the program activities of the agencies concerned," 64 Stat. 578 (1949), 5 U.S.C. § 63o (958), thus
effectively acquiring their missions.
aE.g., 8,868,549 separate procurement actions were effected within the Department Department during
Fiscal Year 1963. OFFicE OF TH SECR.-TARY oF DEFENSE, MILITARY P.IUME CoNTRAcTs AWARs AN
SuacoNrRAcrs PAYMENTS (1963).
'See 55 Stat. 628 (i94), 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1958).
37 Stat. 736 (1913), 5 U.S.C. § 6i1 (958).
'6x Stat. r52-56 (I947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 171-182 (1958).
748 Stat. 1193-97 (1934), 45 U.S.C. H3 154-161 (i958). Although the Department of Labor,
National Labor Relations Board, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, and the National Mediation
Board are generally the most prominent of the agencies concerned with labor matters, they by no means
comprise the entire list. In the railroad field, the National Railroad Adjustment Board resolves grievances
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The contracting function thrusts the Department of Defense into the arena of
labor policy. Historically and today, this process takes place inexorably, despite in-
tention. When the Department of Defense becomes a customer, it needs must
encounter the implications of labor policy that face any buyer. The problems raised
by this simple operation of market place realities are heightened by the fact that the
Department of Defense as a customer is the same entity as the Department of Defense
as a Cabinet arm of government8 Its options in the market place are dictated by the
fundamental devotion to fairness and impartiality that is properly required of all
government activities. Its options are delimited, moreover, by the host of laws,
regulations, and directives that expectably surround the administration of a govern-
mental agency and that are particularly demanded of a military institution whose
civilian employees alone approximate one million. °
Although the Department's contracts involve great financial amounts, its overall
economic influence is easily exaggerated. Defense procurement currently accounts
for some $3o billion annually. Certainly, annual expenditures of that magnitude
assert an economic influence. The limits of that influence, however, should be
clearly understood. The impacts of defense procurement upon regional and state
economies, for example, constitute but one-and only one-factor in the determina-
tion of general prosperity patterns. Defense procurement is not, accordingly, the
measure of any given unemployment problem. Thus, the state of Kansas suffered
a 66.3 per cent loss in prime contract awards between fiscal year x958 and fiscal year
1962. But the unemployment rate in Kansas in calendar year 1962 was relatively low.
Conversely, California experienced a 34.4 per cent increase in prime contract awards
during the same period; yet its unemployment rate in x962 was not low. Had the
1958 rate of prime contract awards remained the same in these two states in 1962,
Kansas might well have had less unemployment and California more, of course.
Still, the decrease in awards to the one and the increase to the other were-to say
the least-incomplete descriptions of the economic well-being of each.'1
On the other hand, the economic influence of defense procurement in a particular
plant-or even industry-can be great indeed. Problems of conversion to non-military
goods or uses aside, any given plant, or certainly line within a plant, may well be
under collective bargaining agreements, 48 Stat. xI89 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1958), and the Railroad
Retirement Board administers the Railroad Retirement Act, 63 Stat. 107 (1949), 45 U.S.C. § 228j (1958),
and the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 63 Stat. 107 (949), 45 U.S.C. § 355 (1958). Also with
respect to government employees, the Civil Service Commission is charged with execution, administration,
and enforcement of a myriad of laws, orders and regulations. 52 Stat. 1194 (1938), 5 U.S.C. § 62 (1958).
In addition, a number of agencies established for other purposes have incidental labor responsibilities.
E.g., the Interstate Commerce Commission is charged with enforcement of the statutory work day and
hours limits for the railroad industry. 34 Stat. I4M7 (1907), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 64 (1958).
'The traditional distinction between proprietary and sovereign attributes of government is not
relevant to this point.
'E.g., Department of Defense Directive 5500.7, Standards of Conduct, May 17, 1963.
"President Johnson has called for the lowest civilian employment level in the Department of
Defense since 195o, which will reduce the number below one million. State of the Union Message, Jan.
8, x964, I10 CONG. Rlc. ioi (daily ed. Jan. 8, 1964).11 The following chart highlights this point:
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taken up entirely with defense production. A construction project may easily be
devoted totally to a defense purpose. Many important companies with substantial
payrolls are overwhelmingly engaged in defense work 12  In these cases, employees
naturally see their employment as dependent on defense procurement. They look
to the Department of Defense as much as to their employer for job security.' 3 By
the same token, managements view their profit structures as intimately bound up
with defense contracts.
This hard reality defines the height of Defense Department involvement in labor
policy. Collective bargaining in such cases is conducted under an umbrella of con-
cern for the viability of a current defense contract or the likelihood of successful com-
petition for a new one. Management must make its responses to labor's demands
Estimated
Change in Military Average
Pime Contract Awards Unemployment
FY 1958- FY z962 Calendar 1962
Amount
(Millions) Percent
California + 1,535 + 34.4% 5.9%
Massachusetts + 575 + 78.2% 5.5%
Colorado + 360 + 575.6% 4.0%
Florida + 336 + 108.7% 5.0%
Connecticut + 316 + 35.2% 5.0%
U.S. Total + 4,030 + 19.2% 5.6%
Washington - 28r - 23.4% 5.5%
Texas - 440 - 30.4% 4.8%
Kansas - 775 - 66.3% 3.7%
Source: OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, FivE YEAR TRENDS IN DEFENSE PROCUREMENT, 1958-1962
(963).
" For example, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, General Dynamics Corporation, and Boeing Company,
the three largest defense contractors in terms of dollar value of awarded contracts during fiscal year 1962,
received in that year contracts totaling $,383,900,000, Sr,r96,6oo,ooo and $r,132,8oo,ooo respectively.
This compared with respective net sales of $1,753,074,000, $1,898,481,7o8 and $1,768,535,oo during
Calendar Year 1962. That such intensive involvement in defense contracting is not restricted to large
contractors is indicated by the figures for Vitro Corporation of America and Gilfillan Corporation,
which rank eighty-fourth and ninety-seventh on the list of recipients of Defense contract awards. Re-
spectively, they received awards totaling $35,ooo,ooo and $28,9oo,ooo during the Fiscal Year in com-
parison with net sales of $47,873,483 and $39,172,585 during the Calendar Year. Because of the
differences between Fiscal Year and Calendar Year and between awards and net sales these comparisons
are valid only as general illustrations. Net sales figures are from Moody's Industrials and contract
award figures are from the Department of Defense List of Net Value of Military Prime Contract Awards
for Fiscal Year 1962.
"Typical of this view is the following statement of position advanced at the 1962 Convention of the
United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers (UAW): "The central fact in any
realistic appraisal of the aerospace workers' problem-both in Canada and the United States-is the role
of government in the aerospace industry. Ninety-five percent of the employment in aircraft and missiles
is defense employment. The aerospace industry is almost wholly the creature of government. The
forms of private enterprise may be observed; the profits of private enterprise are certainly much in evi-
dence. Representatives of private management face representatives of the UAW and IAM [International
Association of Machinists] across the table in aerospace bargaining. Yet the real power over the
aerospace industry is the power of the government-and the real responsibility for policies affecting
aerospace workers is that of the procurement arm of the government." 5o L.R.R.M. 49 (x962).
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in this light, for its economic position will be so defined. Labor, concerned with
the job security of the employees, must formulate its demands in a manner that
accounts for future defense action.
This dependence of labor and management on defense may be mutual. Labor
and management, for their part, may need a particular defense procurement. The
Department of Defense, for its part, may equally need the particular product. Not
all goods purchased by the Department of Defense are readily obtainable in the
market place. It procures the defense of the nation, the defense, indeed, of the free
world. When a complex weapons system is involved, the department cannot im-
mediately turn to another producer for an equivalent product. The choice among
weapons systems is an exceptionally difficult one, requiring the most painstaking of
military, scientific, and economic judgments. Years of preparation precede pro-
duction of a selected system. More years may well be necessary before another pro-
ducer could be substituted, or even added. The Department of Defense cannot wait.
Like labor and management, it too may feel a dependence.
Because other government departments and agencies are primarily concerned
with labor policy, the basic philosophy of the Department of Defense is and has
always been to leave labor matters to the interested civilian agencies.14 From the
directives establishing defense policy to the daily administrative details, this philoso-
phy prevails. It prevailed in the military departments before the Department of
Defense was established.' 5 Labor problems associated with the contracting process
accordingly are remitted to the civilian agencies. The Department of Defense may
have the procurement responsibility, but resolution of any associated labor problems
is their mission.
At the same time, when labor problems threaten the defense of the nation, the
capacity of the Department of Defense to perform its mission is drawn into question.
Remission to the civilian agencies must then withstand pragmatic appraisal. Philo-
sophical propriety is not enough.
The Defense response to labor problems has varied markedly in the course of
time. Always is it unified, however, by the dictates of the defense mission. The
interest in production-defined in intensity by the mission-is the touchstone of
defense responses to problems of labor policy. A review of these responses is in-
structive to an appreciation of the current situation, which involves effective civilian
agencies functioning within an established national labor policy. Such a review
lends itself to separate treatment of three facets of labor policy: labor standards or
practices, labor disputes, and labor supply. For convenience, the history of defense
responses prior to the establishment of the Department of Defense will be confined
to the War Department.
'-See also, ASPR 1'-ioi.i(d), 32 C.F.R. § 12.1X-1(d) (Supp. 1963), which provides that "Each
Department shall remain impartial in and shall refrain from taking a position on the merits of a dispute as
between labor and private management."
"Act of July 26, 1947, 6x Stat. 495-
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I
LABOR STANDARDS OR PRACTICES
The defense experience in the area of labor standards or practices has been
bound up with the field of labor disputes as well. Understandably. Labor standards
and practices regularly are the subject of labor disputes.
Questions of labor standards are also related to problems of labor supply. A
prohibition against discrimination, for example, provides a supply of workers who
otherwise might not have been employed.
The present-day government contract contains a number of provisions govern-
ing labor standards or practices. Nondiscrimination in employment opportunity on
the basis of race, creed, color, or national origin is affirmatively undertaken by the
contractor, who also agrees to require the same efforts of his subcontractors.16 Use
of child labor, and convict labor, is forbidden by the contract.T Once employed,
laborers and mechanics must be paid at least time and one-half for work in excess
of eight hours per day or forty hours per week.18 Additionally, construction workers
must be paid prevailing wages and receive their full pay without unauthorized
deductions.'9
"o Exec. Order No. io925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (i96i). After declaring that discrimination is contrary
to the constitutional principles and policies of the United States and that it is in the general interest
and welfare of the United States to utilize all available manpower efficiently and effectively, the order
establishes the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity to carry out its policies and
purposes. The order requires government contractors and subcontractors to state the essence of their
agreement not to discriminate in advertisements for employees, to advise labor unions representing their
employees, the employees themselves and applicants for employment of the contractor's undertaking, and
to abide by rules and regulations including compliance reporting requirements established by the order
and the Committee. The order provides substantial enforcement powers including the use of judicial
injunctions and criminal proceedings where proper, in addition to termination of existing contracts and
bar of future contract awards.
"A general prohibition against the use of convict labor by government contractors is provided by an
1887 statute, 24 Stat. 411, as revised, 62 Stat. 703, IS U.S.C. § 436 (1958), and by Exec. Order No. 3 25A
of May 18, 19o5. The Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act repeats the prohibition and prohibits child labor
as well. 49 Stat. 2036-39, as amended, 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (958). Child labor prohibitions do not apply
to contracts for construction, research and development, and other purposes not covered by Walsh-Healey.
This hiatus is more theoretical than real in light of the comparable child labor standards of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, which broadly applies to employees engaged in interstate commerce and applicable
statutes in each of the 50 states.
'
8 Walsh-Healey Act, § x(c), 49 Stat. 2036 (1936), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 616 (1958); Contract
Work Hours Standards Act § xo2(a), 76 Stat. 357 (1962), 40 U.S.C. §§ 327-32 (Supp. IV, 1962).
"o Davis-Bacon Act, 46 Stat. 1494 (193x), as amended, 40 U.S.C. § 276a (958). Under the pro-
visions of this act the Secretary of Labor determines the prevailing wage for each classification of laborer
or mechanic to be employed on a government contract in a given locality, 29 C.F.R. § 1.r-12 (1963).
The wage so determined is set forth as an obligation in the government contract. E.g., ASPR XII, Part
4. Enforcement of the obligation is accomplished primarily by the contracting agency but significant
responsibilities rest with the Secretary of Labor under the act and Reorganization Plan No. 14 of 195o, 64
Star. 1267, 5 U.S.C. § 1333 (x958), and with the Comptroller General under the act and under his
general supervision over the expenditure of funds appropriated by the Congress. The Copeland Act,
§ xo(b), 48 Stat. 948 (1934), as amended, 40 U.S.C. § 276 c (1958), and the Anti-Kickback Act, 62
Stat. 740 (1948), IS U.S.C. § 874 (r958), contain the prohibitions against unauthorized deductions. To
induce any person to give up any part of his compensation in violation of these provisions is a criminal
rather than civil offense and is subject to fines up to $5,ooo and imprisonment up to five years.
The Walsh-Healey Act requires payment of the prevailing minimum wage in manufacturing contracts,
but, unlike construction, the wage itself is not expressed in the contracts, but rather is published in the
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Each of these contractual requirements is buttressed by statute or executive order.
Their presence in government contracts is largely a matter of enforcement technique.
It was not always so. The War Department utilized its contracting power to
require similar standards and practices in the absence of statute or executive order
expressing national policy.
An early-and good-illustration was the creation of the Cantonment Adjustment
Commission. In late May of 1917, plans for sixteen Army cantonments comprised
the largest building program the nation had ever undertaken, and under the time
pressures of a World War. Any loss of time occasioned by labor disputes simply
could not be tolerated.
Responding to this need-in advance of the construction-the Secretary of War
entered into an informal agreement with the president of the American Federation of
Labor which gave birth to the Cantonment Adjustment Commission. That agree-
ment, dated June i9, turned the matter of wages, hours, and conditions over to
the Commission, and provided that it "shall use the union scales of wages, hours,
and conditions in force on June I, 1917, in the locality where such [each] canton-
ment is situated."2 The Commission was tripartite in composition, with membership
from labor, management, and the public. As prevailing standards rose, the Com-
mission, as was envisioned by the agreement, provided for the increase in the
particular project. Never was its decision challenged by either side. As a result,
the program was completed without labor difficulties. The Commission's juris-
diction was extended to all construction work of the War Department and, later,
to the Navy as well. Its success was unquestioned.
A similar technique was adopted for Army clothing, where the problem of labor
standards was more acute. In this context, interestingly, neither labor disputes nor
labor supply formed the basis of the action. With the need for uniforms greatly
increased, War Department contracts began to be awarded to firms that maintained
sweatshop conditions. Apart from generalized interest in the treatment of the in-
dustrial manpower that was necessary to support the Army, two aspects of this
Federal Register. This is largely explained by the fact that the Walsh-Healey rate regularly is industry
wide, while the Davis-Bacon rates are individually determined by project. See note 22 inlra.
20 The full text of the agreement was:
"For the adjustment and control of wages, hours, and conditions of labor in the construction of
cantonments, there shall be created an adjustment commission of three persons, appointed by the Secre-
tary of War; one to represent the Army, one the public, and one labor; the last to be nominated by
Samuel Gompers, member of the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense, and president
of the American Federation of Labor.
"As basic standards with reference to each cantonment, such commission shall use the union scales of
wages, hours, and conditions in force on June a, 1917, in the locality where such cantonment is situated.
Consideration shall be given to special circumstances, if any, arising after said date which may require
particular advances in wages or changes in other standards. Adjustment of wages, hours, or conditions
made by such boards are to be treated as binding by all parties."
"NEWTON D. BAXMR
SAML. GOMPERS"
U.S. WAIR DEP'T, OPsIca OF SEcRETARY, A REPORT OF THE AcTsvinEs Op THE WtAt DEPARTmENT IN
THE FIELD OF INDugTRIAL RELATIONS DURING THE WAR 72 (I919) [hereinafter cited as Vit DEp'T RE-
PORT].
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development were of specific concern to the War Department. First, it was in-
tolerable to have uniforms made in any fashion which would allow the transfer of
contagious germs from sweatshop workers to military personnel. Second, delivery
dates were not regularly being met because of the presence of irresponsible and
incompetent contractors. The solution to these problems was the creation of the
Board of Control for Labor Standards in Army Clothing, later reduced to a single
Administrator. This Board was not tripartite-a severe jurisdictional dispute in the
industry preventing selection of a labor representative.-
The Board accomplished its mission through use of a qualified bidders list with
continuing inspection of contractor facilities. Armed with a list of prospective
bidders, the Board conducted preliminary inspections and found qualified only those
contractors who maintained satisfactory conditions, complied with state labor laws,
and had proper protection against fire. Prospective bidders who failed to qualify
were advised of necessary changes and upon making those changes were later
qualified. A continuing inspection was also maintained. Additionally, when disputes
arose, the Board tendered its good offices for mediatory assistance.
Labor standards were also set by the board technique for contracts for harness
and saddlery during World War I. The National Harness and Saddlery Adjustment
Commission was established on a tripartite basis in response to a feared general
strike of the entire industry. Its jurisdiction was defined to include future disputes
for the duration of the war. Contrary to the Cantonment Adjustment Commission,
the commission in this industry set nationwide rates, a distinction between con-
struction and manufacturing that inheres in the nature of the work and that has
persisted under the later enacted wage-setting statutes 2
"
1 The Amalgamated Garment Workers Association (AGWA) led by Sidney Hillman had seceded from
the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and was regarded as an outlaw independent union competing
with the United Clothing Workers of America (UCWA), the AFL affiliate. The dispute between the two
unions was irreconcilable even in the face of War Department efforts to achieve an understanding between
them. The Secretary of War adopted a policy of strict impartiality between the two organizations and
in keeping with this policy declined appointment of anyone associated with either organization to deal
with controversies arising in the manufacture of Army clothing. The conflict was crystallized in a case
involving Mark Cowan and Company. Cowan's employees, members of the AGWA, struck and alleged
to the Board of Control that Cowan was not maintaining hours and working conditions as required
by the Board. When the Board sought to resolve the dispute with Cowan, the latter responded that it
had an agreement with the UCWA and would operate its plant with members of that organization
in accord with the Board's requirements. The Board endeavored to hold a hearing to resolve the dispute
but Cowan refused to participate. The Board countered by refusing to certify Cowan as an acceptable
contractor until it submitted to its jurisdiction. In due course the contractor complied and the con-
troversy was adjusted. The adjustment, however, was in essence a Pyrrhic victory since Cowan in the
intervening time had manned his factory completely with UCWA workers and the striking AGWA
members had obtained other employment. VAR DEP'T REPoRT, Op. cit. supra note 2o, at 17-19.
"
5 Thus wage determinations for construction work under the Davis-Bacon Act are based upon rates
found on similar projects in the city, town, village, or other civil subdivision of the state in which the
work is to be performed (§ i) whereas those for the industries covered by the Walsh-Healey Act are
derived from the wages "for persons employed on similar work or in the particular or similar industries
or groups of industries currently operating in the locality" in which the contract is to be performed
(§ i(b)). The reference to "locality" in the Walsh-Healey Act comprehends industry-wide standards. In
a given case, this may result in a single nationwide rate. Covington Mills v. Mitchell, 229 F.2d 5o6
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. X002 (1955).
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Established as minima, the rates fixed by the National Harness and Saddlery
Adjustment Commission soon became maxima as well, thus completing the total
control of wages in the Commission. In an industry that was otherwise on the decline,
the magnified demands of the War Department resulted in a keen competition for
workers, with a consequent upward influence on wages and an attending potential
increase in costs to the War Department. The Commission responded by ruling
that its standard wages could not be exceeded by contractors.
The Commission also set hours, so complete was its control. With the ruling
that the standard wages constituted a ceiling as well as a floor, the competition for
workers shifted to hours. Contractors sought to attract workers by offering longer
hours, and hence larger earnings. The Commission responded by setting a maximum
on hours of work, subject to exception only upon its grant of special authority.
Other actions were taken by the War Department directly, without the establish-
ment of a board. It was during the first World War that the Supreme Court held
the federal child labor law unconstitutional.23 The War Department promptly
required the same prohibition in its contracts. The industrial army essential to the
war effort was not to be composed of children.
Similarly, the War Department controlled the maintenance or relaxation of state
labor standards that were already established. State legislation by the outbreak of
the war regulated hours of work, the employment of women and children, sanitary
facilities and the like. The War Department maintained relations with the various
state agencies charged with enforcement of this legislation, adopted a policy that the
existing standards should not be relaxed except in an emergency, and centered in
itself the power to determine when relaxation was proper. Under this arrangement,
there were no general relaxations and the specific ones were comparatively few and
of limited duration.
The philosophy underlying all of these World War I actions was simple: the
efficient and effective conduct of war. A memorandum of suggestions for arsenal
commanders and manufacturers, issued by the Chief of Ordnance, sums it up well:
In view of the urgent necessity for a prompt increase in the volume of production of
practically every article required for the conduct of the war, vigilance is demanded of all
those in any way associated with industry lest the safeguards with which the people of
this country have sought to protect labor should be unwisely and unnecessarily broken
down. It is a fair assumption that for the most part these safeguards are the mechanisms
of efficiency. Industrial history proves that reasonable hours, fair working conditions, and
a proper wage scale are essential to high production. During the war every attempt should
be made to conserve in every way possible all of our achievements in the way of social
"
5The Keating-Owen bill of September i, xgx6, ch. 432, 39 Stat. 675, prohibited interstate shipment
of products of establishments in which children below specified minimum ages were employed. The law
became effective one year after passage and its enforcement was enjoined almost immediately. The in-
junction was appealed ultimately to the Supreme Court which then sustained the injunction and declared
the act unconstitutional. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1917). This position, of course, was
specifically overruled when the constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 was upheld.
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 1oo (1940).
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betterment. But the pressing argument for maintaining industrial safeguards in the
present emergency is that they actually contribute to efficiency. To waive them would
be a shortsighted policy, leading gradually but inevitably toward lowered production.
It might be expected that an individual working io hours a day instead of 8, or ii hours a
day instead of io, would turn out more goods. He can, and doubtless will, for the first few
days. But experience shows us that in a few weeks, or a few months, the output will
be the same, or even less, than it was during the shorter day.
This department, procuring war material in great quantities and of many different
kinds, can not be without interest as to the conditions under which this material is manu-
factured. In peace time we can afford to depend upon routine agencies for seeing to it
that those engaged on Government work are both reasonably efficient and fairly protected
in the conduct of their work. There is grave danger, however, that under stress of war
such consideration may be overlooked, and that not only injustice may be done to indi-
vidual workers and groups of workers but that quantity and quality production may
itself suffer.24
As the War Department emerged from World War I, its concern with labor
problems-no longer requiring action to assure production-was taken up with
planning. 5 Continuing efforts were made to develop an industrial mobilization
plan for use in a future war effort. And while successive plans were drafted, no plan
was ever adopted. World War II, with its urgency, arrived in the absence of an
accepted plan.26
World War II presented the War Department with a far different context of labor
standards and practices. The locally prevailing wages requirement for construction
that had been administratively born in the Cantonment Adjustment Commission
was now a statutory command of the Davis-Bacon Act.27 The safety and health
concerns of the Board of Control for Labor Standards were largely embodied in the
Walsh-Healey Act, as was the prohibition against child labor that formerly existed
only in contract clauses.28 The Walsh-Healey Act also embraced the wage-setting
features for manufacturing that had previously been the work of the National Harness
and Saddlery Adjustment Commission.2 9 The bulk of the problems that had
triggered these three major administrative efforts-and accomplishments-of World
War I were not so open to executive action in World War II. Legislation had taken
up where administration stopped.
Legislation had, indeed, gone further. The Wagner Act had been enacted.3 °
Guaranteeing employees the right to join unions, to bargain collectively, and to
" General Orders No. 13, Nov. 15, 1917, Office of The Chief of Ordnance, U.S.A., Suggestions for
Arsenal Commanders and Manufacturers.
" For a more extensive discussion of the role of the War Department in labor matters in World War I,
see WAR DEP'T REPORT, op. cit. supra note 20, which furnishes the basis for the history of that period
discussed in this article.
" BYRON FAIRCHILD & JONATHAN GRossmAx, TH-E ARMY AND INsUsrmAL MANPOW ER 3-20 (1959).
Much of the material on which the World War II discussion in this article is based was obtained from this
worthwhile history.
27 See note i9 supra.
28 See note 17 supra.
" See note 22 supra.
11 Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 49 Star. 449-57.
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engage in concerted activities in furtherance of collective bargaining, the act also
proscribed certain employer actions as unfair labor practices.
Unlike Davis-Bacon and Walsh-Healey, the Wagner Act made no provision for
government contracts. Whereas the two former required compliance clauses in the
contracts-and, moreover, applied only to government work-the latter applied to
industry generally and was silent on government contracts.
A major labor issue on military contracts prior to our entering the war was, as
a result, enforcement of the Wagner Act. Positions were taken on both sides of the
question whether or not companies that did not comply with the act should be
denied contracts? 1 After some vacillation, the matter was finally resolved that the
War Department should not enforce the act through contract actions. The labor
relations practices of a prospective contractor were a matter to be considered, it was
agreed, but only one among many. Contracts had to be awarded in furtherance
of the interest in production necessary to the effective waging of war. In any event,
by the time the issue was settled, the President had declared an unlimited national
emergency?2 The company whose juxtaposed Wagner Act violations and contract
awards had particularly aggravated the argument had been successfully organized
and had concluded a collective bargaining agreement which provided for a union
shop and a wage scale matching the highest in the industry.33 The issue had become
less pressing 4
The responsibility for wage rates and labor disputes exercised in World War I
by the Cantonment Adjustment Commission, the Board of Control for Labor Stand-
ards in Army Clothing, and the National Harness and Saddlery Adjustment Com-
mission was in World War II the task of the National War Labor Board. Tripartite
in composition, and based on the voluntary abandonment of economic force by
"
1The Department of Interior attempted to deal with this issue by requiring vendors to certify to
compliance with the Wagner Act in order to obtain payment under its contracts. Upon refusal by a
contractor to execute such a certification, the question of its propriety was submitted to the Comptroller
General who, after ruling that there was no authority to require compliance with the Act as a condition
precedent to the award of a contract concluded: "there likewise would appear no proper or legal basis
for requiring as a condition precedent to payment of the contract price . . . that the bidder certify that
it complied with the National Labor Relations Act in the performance of the contract." 2o Dacs. Coms.
GE. I4 (940).
" 6 Fed. Reg. 2617 (941). In this Proclamation, the President said, "I call upon all of our loyal
workmen as well as employers to merge their lesser differences in the larger effort to insure the survival
of the only kind of Government which recognizes the rights of labor or of capital."
aa FAIRCHILD & GRossmAN, op. cit. supra note 26, at 43.
a" The issue has not disappeared, though, and is still raised today. The opinions of the Comptroller
General on the subject, however, suggest that legislation would be required for a different result.
17 Dacs. ComP. GEN. 37 ('937), cited with approval at 18 id. 285, 294 (1938), 19 id. 748, 750 (1940),
20 id. 14, 14-15 (1940) and 33 id. 477, 479 (1954). See also note 31 supra. At least two efforts have
been made to secure legislation but in both instances the bills were not reported out of Committee. The
first attempt was in 1938 (S. 3390, Feb. 4, X938, and H.R. 9745, March 4, 1938, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.),
and the second in 1955 (S. 176o, April 20, 1955, H.R. 6592, June 1, 1955, and H.R. 6661, June 6, 1955,
84th Cong. ist Sess.). Although general legislation of this type has not been adopted the Bituminous Coal
Act of 1937 provided for the denial and/or cancellation of government contracts with employers subject
to the act who denied their employees the right to organize and to bargain. Act of April 26, X937, § 9,
50 Stat. 1187.
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labor and management, the National War Labor Board was created by the President,
not the War Department. 3 5 Special supplementary commissions this time were not
undertaken by the War Department. Although the executive order creating the
War Labor Board envisioned that its decisions would be binding on the parties to any
dispute it considered, no provision was made for enforcement machinery. 6
Not surprisingly, enforcement of War Labor Board decisions was viewed differ-
ently from the Wagner Act. Denial of contracts to companies in non-compliance
with the Wagner Act could mean loss of the opportunity to obtain a needed product.
War Labor Board decisions, on the other hand, were designed to end disputes that
otherwise threatened to interrupt production. Seizure was accordingly relied
upon to enforce the Board's decisions and also those of a short-lived predecessor, the
National Defense Mediation Board.3 7 Seizure was the technique whether labor or
management was the intransigent party.3s Where the company involved was en-
gaged in essential work for the war effort, War Department enforcement of the
Board's decision was immediately in furtherance of the critical interest in continued
production. In those few instances in which the company was not engaged in
essential war work, seizure was necessary to protect-and conclusively establish-the
foundation of the War Labor Board: resolution of labor disputes without inter-
ruption of work and operations.3 9 Should that foundation have been allowed to
become infirm in an instance involving non-essential production, the life blood of
the Board could have been spilled in an essential case. The question about enforce-
ment of decisions of the National War Labor Board-unlike the Wagner Act-
admitted of only an affirmative answer.
In time, the War Labor Board was charged with wage stabilization, as is brought
out in the succeeding section of this article, and its jurisdiction was extended beyond
disputes.40 Although the control over labor standards thus exercised by the govern-
ment was extensive, the role of the War Department was largely confined to en-
forcement. Labor standards and practices were taken up by specially created
agencies such as the War Labor Board but they were civilian agencies.
Similarly today, the Department of Defense plays a minimal role in the field of
"' Exec. Order No. 9017, 7 Fed. Reg. 237 (1942).
See text at note 53 infra.
5TThere were three seizures involving the National Defense Mediation Board: North American Avia-
tion, Inc., Federal Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, and Air Associates, Inc. In North American,
the seizure resulted from a union refusal to continue work and operations while the Board disposed of the
case. The other tvo seizures resulted from the companies' refusals to accept the Board's recommendations.
NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD, TaRMINATION REPORT 20 (1947).
"
5Under the National War Labor Board, there were 40 seizures. Id. app. J-39(a).
"' The capacity of the United States to do so was tested by Montgomery Ward and Company, i5o
F.2d 369, 380 (7 th Cir. 1945). In affirming the President's power to seize, the court ruled: "It matters
not whether this group [of employees] is actually engaged in making articles needful in the War or in
distributing such articles among those engaged in essential war industry." This decision was bottomed
on the War Labor Disputes Act. The power of the President to take such action solely through his
powers as Commander-in-Chief was also argued in that case but was left undecided. Subsequently in
1952 it was decided by the Supreme Court that at least in time of peace, the President has no such
inherent powers. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
"0 See text at notes 54-57 infra.
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labor standards and practices. The Davis-Bacon and Walsh-Healey acts remain in
force, requiring the payment of prevailing wages in both construction and manu-
facturing. The former is enforced by the Department of Defense as a contracting
agency, the latter by the Department of Labor under the specific provisions of the
statute itself. The Taft-Hartley Act has succeeded the Wagner Act and, like its
predecessor, is not enforced by the Department of Defense-non-compliance remains
one of many factors to be considered in determining whether or not production
demands can be met.41 The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service is charged
with responsibility for disputes affecting commerce, thus covering much the same
ground as the National War Labor Board. Its efforts are strictly mediatory, however,
and so no question of enforcing decisions has arisen 4
2
In one area-determinations of cost allowability-the Department of Defense does
specifically address itself to labor standards or practices. Cost type contracts do not
guarantee the contractor recoupment of all his costs. The reasonableness of the
various costs incurred must be established. When the cost is associated with a labor
standard or practice, the determination of reasonableness by the Department of
Defense inevitably involves a judgment on the particular standard or practice.43
The influence that these cost allowability decisions exert on the private labor
management relationship is minor. True, contractors are likely to eschew agreeing
to labor demands for standards or practices that have been or could be expected to be
ruled unreasonable and disallowed wholly or partially for purposes of cost re-
imbursement. On the other hand, labor standards and practices are not made up
of whole cloth, and Defense decisions on allowability for cost purposes are also
not reached in a vacuum. Trends in industrial practice can be discerned and weighed
in the process of determination. The effort to make cost decisions reflective rather
than dispositive of industrial customs and trends is well illustrated by problems
involving missile and space sites. Cost reasonableness as well as labor disputes at
missile and space sites fall within the jurisdiction of the Missile Sites Labor
Commission 4 Composed of representatives of labor, management, and the public,
and chaired by the Secretary of Labor, with the Director of the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service serving as Vice Chairman, the Commission advises the
Department of Defense on the reasonableness of costs associated with labor. Since
the advice is based on what prevails in the private sector, and given by persons
particularly knowledgeable in that regard, the defense influence is held to a minimum.
Determinations of cost allowability are inherent in the contracting process; the
1 See note 34 supra.
"When the Railway Labor Act is involved, the relevant agency is, of course, the National Mediation
Board. See text at notes 6-7 supra. Its efforts, in this context, are also mediatory. See also text at note
61 infra.
"See ASPR i5-2o5.6, 32 C.F.R. § 15.2o5-6 (i96i) (Compensation for Personal Services); 15-205.xo,
32 C.F.R. § 15.205-10 (i96i) (Health and Welfare Costs); 15-205.18, 32 C.F.R. § 15.205-18 (i96z)
(Labor Relations Costs); 15-205.25, 32 C.F.R. § i5.205-25 (Overtime); 15-205.33, 32 C.F.R. § 15.205-33
(i96i) (Recruiting Costs); 15-205.39, 32 C.F.R. § i5.2o5-39 (g6i) (Severance Pay).
"'Exec. Order No. 10946, 26 Fed. Reg. 4629 (i965).
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other military involvements in labor standards and practices traced in this review
went beyond the administrative aspects of the contract to the fundamental interest
in obtaining the purchased production. Not only must the Defense Department per-
form its mission within its budget and without waste of public funds, not only is
pursuit of economy an essential attribute of contracting authority, but, most simply,
the use of cost-type contracts by definition requires cost decisions. Labor standards
and practices become relevant as cost items that must be reviewed with the rest.
The other military concerns with labor standards and practices were more intimately
bound up with the mission of defending the nation. Certainly this was so when
essential production was threatened by labor disputes. But even beyond disputes, as
with the Board of Control for Labor Standards in Army Clothing, labor standards
and practices could affect production and thus trigger the most critical of defense
interests. The intensity of this interest was understandably high in World War I,
and so the War Department was quite active in the field of labor standards. With
the lessened intensity of the period between World War I and World War II, a plan
for industrial mobilization could not be adopted. World War II ushered in a new
era of criticality, but legislation had created a framework for action. In addition,
the response of civilian agencies was more immediate, more pervasive, and more
effective. Similarly, at present, the civilian agencies perform a broader and more
significant role. Whether the urgency be defined by hot war, cold war, or peace,
the Defense need for production to perform its mission is paramount; the require-
ment for defense action to that end depends not only on the criticality of the product
but on the civilian response as well.
II
LABOR DxsPuTs
If labor standards or practices sometimes threaten production, strikes and lockouts
always do. The Department of Defense interest in labor disputes, necessarily, is reso-
lution without interruption of work and operations. The intensity of this interest
varies with the importance of the particular contract.4 5 Missiles and shoes, bullets
and socks, raise different issues of criticality.
When the contract is critical, when essential production is involved, the defense
interest is of the highest magnitude. Battles cannot be postponed, wars cannot be
won, until the necessary weapons reach the battlefield. The military must be
equipped and ready. Disputes that delay the needed readiness must be ended. The
enemy does not grant an extension of time by reason of labor difficulties in the in-
dustrial army.
This interest and the established policy of remitting labor problems to the civilian
agencies are not inconsistent. To be interested in the end does not require participa-
tion in the means. Only when other means are lacking or inadequate does devotion
to the end overcome reluctance at engaging in the means.
"See ASPR 12-IOie, 32 C..R. 12.101(e) (I96I).
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Thus it was in World War I. The accepted policy was that labor matters were
the province of the Department of Labor; the War Department would simply channel
problems affecting its contractors to the Labor Department for adjustment through
its Conciliation Service.
The program for building cantonments was too large and too critical, however,
to risk waiting until disputes actually arose and strikes occurred. So the Cantonment
Adjustment Commission was created. By the same token, the threatened industry-
wide strike in harness and saddlery could not be allowed to take place, so great was
the need for uninterrupted and expanded production. So the National Harness and
Saddlery Commission was established. And the contagion and non-delivery prob.
lems in military clothing existed whether or not a labor dispute would develop. So
the Board of Control for Labor Standards was born.
Still, the War Department clung to its basic philosophy that labor problems should
be resolved by the Department of Labor. The three boards were, it was true, excep-
tions; but the basic philosophy remained the standard.
It soon developed, however, that contractors were less cooperative with repre-
sentatives of the Department of Labor than they were with War Department per-
sonnel. Manufacturers tended to think of the Department of Labor as a peacetime
mediation activity which tendered good offices that they could accept or reject at
will.
As a result, the War Department was drawn more broadly into the business of
resolving labor disputes. In munitions, the Ordnance Department set up an In-
dustrial Service Section, which plunged fully into the field of adjusting disputes.
It mediated, arbitrated, and generally did whatever was necessary to bring about a
resolution. The Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor adopted a policy
of avoiding participation whenever the Ordnance Department assumed jurisdiction
of a dispute.
When the Industrial Service Section was not able to effect a resolution, it referred
the matter to the National War Labor Board. Set up by the Secretary of Labor and
proclaimed by the President, the War Labor Board had no enforcement power."
0
The War Department provided it.
Two extreme cases tested the machinery so established. Both were referred to
the National War Labor Board. In one, the worlers-contrary to the urging of
their union-refused to accept the decision. The President wrote a public letter to
the striking employees which requested a return to work and acceptance of the award
in no uncertain terms:
Therefore, I desire that you return to work and abide by the award. If you refuse,
each of you will be barred from employment in any war industry in the community in
which the strike occurs for a period of one year. During that time the United States
Employment Service will decline to obtain employment for you in any war industry else-
where in the United States, as well as under the War and Navy Departments, the Ship-
"o Presidential Proclamation of April 8, 1918, 65 Cong., 2d Sess. (19x8).
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ping Board, the Railroad Administration, and all other Government agencies, and the
draft boards will be instructed to reject any claim of exemption based on your alleged use-
fulness on war production.47
The decision was accepted, and the men returned to work.
The other case involved a management refusal to accept a decision. The War
Department commandeered the plant and installed the Ordnance Department to
operate it s
An Industrial Service Section was also established in the Construction Division.
This section functioned much as a scale model of the Cantonment Adjustment
Commission, disposing of as many as twenty controversies a day. Major matters
were referred to the Commission.
The Quartermaster Corps followed suit. Its Industrial Service Section performed
the work of the Administrator of Labor Standards in Army Clothing-the successor
of the Board of Control-as well.
Aircraft similarly received special attention. The Aircraft Bureau had its In-
dustrial Service Section, charged with the resolution of disputes involving aircraft
contractors.
Perhaps the most aggressive action of the War Department in World War I
in the labor area-and certainly the most colorful-took place in the lumber camps
of the Northwest which produced spruce essential to the manufacture of airplanes.
A strike had occurred and been unsuccessful, the men had returned to work but were
engaging in a slow-down, and a renewed strike effort seemed clearly in the offing.
An Army colonel was dispatched to the area. He quickly organized the men into
"7 The letter was the culmination of intensive efforts to resolve a dispute which had continued for
over a year. It occurred in Bridgeport, Conn., where the Machinists' union was demanding wage increases
and adjustments of various grievances. Initially there were efforts to resolve the dispute by local concilia-
tion. These efforts were unsuccessful and a series of strikes resulted in various plants involved in the
production of ordnance material. The first effort at resolution by an agency outside of the Bridgeport
area was made by an Ordnance Wage Adjustment Board. This Board failed and the Secretary of War
referred the matter to the National War Labor Board. Ultimately a decision of the Board umpire was
handed down ruling on essentially all aspects of the controversy. The rulings, however, did not meet
labor's anticipations and a strike resulted. This strike was deemed to jeopardize not only the production
programs affected but also the validity of the decisions of the government agencies dealing with labor
controversies. Because of the gravity of the situation the matter was referred by the Secretary of Labor,
the Acting Secretary of War, and the Chairman of the National War Labor Board to the President
who issued the quoted letter. XVAR DaP'T REPoar, op. cit. supra note 2o, at 32-34.
"
8 Although the dispute initially involved wages only, it grew to significantly larger proportions. The
company, Smith and Wesson Company of Springfield, Massachusetts, operated with use of what have
since been termed "yellow dog" contracts and responded to wage demands and subsequent union
organization efforts by discharging employees involved. These practices continued in the face of a
National War Labor Board principle stating: "The right of workers to organize in trade unions and to
bargain collectively through chosen representatives is recognized and affirmed. This right should not be
denied, abridged or interfered with by the employers in any manner whatsoever." In any event a strike
involving about half of Smith and Wesson's employees occurred. Unsuccessful efforts by the War Depart-
ment to resolve the dispute led to action by the National War Labor Board. The Board in part ordered
the acceptance by the company of the principle of collective bargaining. The Company denied the
Board's jurisdiction, declined to accept its decision, and indicated willingness instead to have the War
Department commandeer the plant. Seeing no alternative, the War Department, with the consent of the
President, did just that, dispensing with the services of the company officers and installing Ordnance
Department representatives to operate the plant directly. Id. at 34-36, 86-89.
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his own Loyal Legion of Loggers and Lumbermen, won the complete confidence of
both the men and the operators, and-under authority granted by both sides-
promulgated a charter of working conditions that was in turn implemented. Pro-
duction of the essential spruce went forward4
With the end of World War I, the War Department reverted to its historic policy
of non-intervention. Labor problems again were to be the province of the civilian
agencies of government.
World War II, as we have seen, involved a greatly changed framework. Legisla-
tion had covered much of the ground previously requiring administrative action.
In addition, the great concern that defense production not be interrupted by strikes
found expression in the creation of new civilian agencies by the President rather
than the establishment of special commissions by the War Department.
The first such agency was the National Defense Mediation Board, created by
executive order on March i9, I94I. Tripartite in nature, the Board was composed
of four labor members, four management members, and three public members.
Individual disputes were to be handled by a three-man panel, one from each repre-
sentative group. Panels were empowered to hold hearings, find facts, make recom-
mendations for settlement and-with the consent of the parties-provide arbitrators.
The Board's jurisdiction was confined to disputes which were certified to it by the
Secretary of Labor as threatening defense production and as not susceptible of resolu-
tion by the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor. Thus, the foundation
of the Board-the chief vehicle for adjustment of disputes-was previous efforts by
the traditional civilian agency in the field.
The National Defense Mediation Board treated all issues in dispute. Its procedure
was to concentrate on mediation first and resort to recommendations for settlement
only when an adjustment was not forthcoming. While its recommendations were
not binding on the parties-as was true of the National War Labor Board in World
War I-the overriding concern with continued production led the War Department
to seize the few companies that had refused to accept its recommendations."'
The Mediation Board was, however, short lived. Its demise was the result of an
unusually bitter and highly unpopular dispute involving the mines of the steel in-
dustry. The dispute saw two brief shut downs of the mines, a rejected recom-
mendation of the Board accompanied by the resignation of two of its members
and another shutdown, and finally a submission of the dispute for binding decision
by a special board of arbitrators.52 The appointment of the special board-which
ibid.
"oExec. Order No. 8716, 6 Fed. Reg. 1532 (I941).
51 One of the three seizures in support of the National Defense Mediation Board involved an un-
cooperative union. See note 37 supra.
"' The dispute involved the demand of the United Mine Workers for a union shop. The recom-
mendation of the Board was against the union shop on the grounds that 95% of the miners were already
union members, the union was capable of organizing the remainder and the union shop clause was not
necessary to the security of the miners. While so recommending, the Board went on to suggest that
the nonunion miners should voluntarily join the union. The CIO members dissented and resigned
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reached a contrary decision-undercut the Mediation Board's authority. And the
two resignations left the Board hopelessly unrepresentative. The Board's usefulness
thus ended, a gap existed in the machinery for resolution of disputes.
The decision of the special board of arbitrators, however, was handed down on
the day Pearl Harbor was attacked, and the surge of patriotism and national unity
that followed made the gap insignificant.
In any event, on January 12, 1942, the President issued an executive order creating
the National War Labor Board to take up where the Mediation Board stopped.
Again tripartite, the War Labor Board had twelve members, equally divided among
labor, management, and the public. The chairman was the previous head of the
Mediation Board, whose case load was transferred to the Labor Board.
The Labor Board differed from the Mediation Board in two significant respects.
First, it was empowered to take jurisdiction sua sponte after consultation with the
Secretary of Labor as well as upon his certification. Second, and far more important,
the executive order expressly made decisions of the Labor Board binding on the
parties. "After it takes jurisdiction, the Board shall finally determine the dispute
and for this purpose may use mediation, voluntary arbitration, or arbitration under
rules established by the Board." 3 Although the Board was founded on the voluntary
cooperation of labor and management, its grant of powers envisioned arbitration
under procedures not agreed to by the immediate parties. No enforcement machinery
was provided, however. This gap, as we have noted, was filled by the War Depart-
ment.
As the war progressed, fears of inflation grew. Reminiscent of the harness and
saddlery industry in World War I, contractors tended to compete for needed labor
by improving wages. This became a matter of concern to the Board.
The problem of inflation also concerned the President and the Congress. At
the request of the President for legislative authority to stabilize living costs, Congress
enacted the Emergency Price Control Act in January 1942, giving the President
power over prices,5 4 and in October of the same year it expanded that power to
include wages and salaries by passing the Economic Stabilization Act."5 Promptly
upon the expansion, the President empowered the Labor Board to stabilize all wages,
whether or not a dispute existed56 And he created the position of Director of Eco-
from the Board. To bring a termination to the strike that resulted, the dispute was submitted to the
special tripartite board, whose contrary decision was dissented from by the industry member. However
by virtue of prior agreement this decision was final and binding. JOEL SEIDmAN, A.mE.IcAN LABOR
FRom DEFENSE TO RECONVERSION 64-67 (1953).
'
5 See note 35 supra.
1
'Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23.
"
5 Act of Oct. 2, 1942, ch. 578, 56 Stat. 765.
" Exec. Order No. 9250, 7 Fed. Reg. 7871 (1942). The benchmark for the wage field generally was
established by the Little Steel Cases, NWLB Nos. 30, 31, 34 and 35, decided July 16, 1942. The cases
arose out of a union demand for a one dollar per day increase to reflect the increased cost of living
experienced since their last general increase in April 1941. The Board, however, found the cost of
living increase of 15% dated from January, 1941. Thus the April 1941 increase of the steelworkers was
included within the 15%, and the Board found a 5.5 cents per hour increase rather than a $S.oo per day
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nomic Stabilization, whose approval was necessary before any wage increase which
the Board considered would require a price increase could be made effective. 7
The War Department meanwhile worked closely with the responsible civilian
agencies and continually impressed upon them the military significance of the various
disputes that developed. In addition, it engaged in repeated publicity campaigns to
raise workers' morale and promote their interest in continued production. But
the process of resolving disputes remained with the civilian agencies, first with
the established Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor and ultimately
with the specially created-but also civilian-War Labor Board."8  The War Depart-
ment, of course, enforced Board decisions by seizure.
Following World War IT, the overall context again changed. In 1947, Congress
enacted the Taft-Hardey Act. Among its provisions amending the Wagner Act were
those providing for the eighty-day injunction of disputes threatening the national
health and safety.50 Since a strike involving a critical defense industry regularly
creates an emergency within the meaning of Taft-Hartley, this legislation has im-
portantly bolstered the traditional policy of leaving disputes to the civilian agencies
concerned with labor matters. Taft-Hardey also removed the Conciliation Service
from the Department of Labor, giving it increased stature as an independent agency.00
The renamed Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service is now the focal point for
all disputes affecting commerce. The Department of Labor retains an important
overriding interest, constituting as it does the paramount agency for labor policy of
the government. When railroads or airlines are involved, the Emergency Board
provisions of the Railway Labor Act-staying strikes for a period of sixty days-
and the mediatory efforts of the National Mediation Board are triggered. 1 This
appropriate to bring wages up to date. This decision, the famous Little Steel formula, provided the
foundation throughout the war period for determining "across-the-board" increases to compensate for
increases in the cost of living.
57 See SEIDMAN, Op. cit. supra note 52, at x16-17. Within this framework, however, the Board con-
sidered that it had considerable latitude (NWLB Rep. 187) and continued to adjust wages to cure mal-
adjustments, inequities, or substandards of living, and to promote the effective prosecution of the War.
This continued into March 1943. But on April 8, 1943, Exec. Order No. 9328, 8 Fed. Reg. 4681 0943),
generally referred to as the "hold-the-line order," limited severely the wage rate increases that the NWLB
could thereafter approve. Specifically the order directed NWLB to authorize "no further increase in
wage or salaries except such as are clearly necessary to correct substandards of living, provided that
nothing herein shall be construed to prevent such agencies from making such wage or salary readjustments
as may be deemed appropriate and may not have heretofore been made to compensate, in accordance
with the Little Steel formula as heretofore defined by the National War Labor Board, for the rise in the
cost of living between January I, 194x and May i, X942. Nor shall anything herein be construed to
prevent such agencies subject to the general policies and directives of the Economic Stabilization Director
from authorizing reasonable adjustments of wages and salaries in case of promotions, reclassifications,
merit increases, incentive wages or the like, provided that such adjustments do not increage the level of
production cost appreciably or furnish the basis either to increase prices or to resist otherwise justifiable
reduction in prices."
"
8 For a comprehensive review of the development of special civilian agencies and the surrounding
context, see SEIDMAN, op. cit. supra note 52.
52 Star. 1o62 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1958).
60 61 Stat. 53 (947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 172 (958).
6144 Stat. 586 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § z6o (1958). These provisions call for the appoint-
ment of an Emergency Board which must report to the President within 30 days. The status quo must
be maintained pending submission of the report and for 30 days thereafter.
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framework leaves little room-and the effectiveness of these agencies little need-for
any departure by the Department of Defense from its established non-intervention
policy.
Occasionally, ad hoc procedures may be invoked, as in the recent boards set up
to aid in the resolution of disputes affecting the aerospace industry, which of course
is heavily oriented toward defense work. These boards, however, were established
by the President, not the Defense Department, and on the recommendation of the
Secretary of Labor and the Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service 2
In one area, a board has been established on a continuing basis-the Missile
Sites Labor Commission. Again, this was done by the President on the recommenda-
tion of the Secretary of Labor. The special criticality of the nation's missile and
space sites-and the massive nature of the task of activating them-required the
creation of a Commission that was particularly equipped to aid in securing un-
interrupted and economical work and operations. In a sense, the Missile Sites Labor
Commission is analogous to the Cantonment Adjustment Commission. Missile and
space sites constitute a discrete, massive, and time-conscious program much as
the building of cantonments did. Both commissions were designed to aid in the
resolution of disputes based on the voluntary cooperation of the parties. But where
the Cantonment Adjustment Commission set wages, the Missile Sites Labor Com-
mission advises on the reasonableness of rates set by the parties themselves. And,
as noted, the Missile Sites Commission derived from the recommendation of the
labor arm of the government, not the military as with the Cantonment Commission.
The Missile Sites Labor Commission has recommended a standardization of com-
pensation practices in two locations, both of which were put into effect through
contract clauses.03 At Cape Kennedy and the Mississippi Test Facility, labor and
management negotiated project stabilization agreements, providing for standardized
practices and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Designed to promote economy and
industrial stability on two particularly critical sites, these agreements facilitated the
national defense. Accordingly, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Admin-
istrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Agency invoked the War Powers
Act, authorizing the money provisions of the agreements to be specified in govern-
ment contracts and hence required of all construction contractors.6" The primary goal
sThe President established two such Boards. One, with George W. Taylor as Chairman, was
appointed on July 21, 1962 to assist the Aerospace Industry negotiations generally. The dispute involving
the Boeing Company was not included in this group and was handled by a second board appointed Sept.
13, x962 with Saul Wallen as Chairman. The Taylor Board submitted reports including recommenda-
tions to the President on Sept. i and i, 1962. With the exception of Lockheed, the companies and
unions accepted the Board Recommendations. The Lockheed dispute, however, continued and by Exec.
Order No. tao68, 18 Fed. Reg. 4939 (1962), the President appointed a Board under the Taft-Hartley Act
to forestall a strike. The Boeing dispute was similarly not resolved by the ad hoc board appointed in
that case and a Taft-Hartley Board was appointed under Exec. Order No. 11078, 29 Fed. Reg. 679 (1963).
In both cases the parties negotiated settlements while the injunctions were in effect.
"
5E.g., ASPR 12-403.5, 32 C.F.R. 12.403-5 (i96i).
o' The determinations enabling the inclusion of the money provisions in government contracts were
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of uninterrupted production was thus sought, with the added benefit of increased
economy in the compensation practices themselves.
Apart from these cases involving the War Powers Act, a series of Comptroller
General decisions has constricted the Defense Department's capacity to use its con-
tracting authority with a view toward resolving labor disputes. The keystone of all
procurement is competition. Whether a contract is awarded by bidding or negotia-
tion, the selected contractor has prevailed in a competition. If the competition does
not revolve around price, it nonetheless involves cost. As the watchdog over the
appropriations of the Congress, the Comptroller General must insure that the execu-
tive branch does not misspend money made available by the legislature. 5 In one
case after another, he has ruled that contractual provisions on a variety of labor
matters are not proper, either because they increase cost directly by requiring
contractors to undergo greater expenditures or because they threaten to do so in-
directly by restricting the range of potential contractors and thus narrowing the
competition.66
Within this overall framework, the matter of labor disputes becomes for the
Department of Defense essentially a question of capacity to perform. Like com-
pliance with the Wagner Act, labor disputes are one factor to be considered in
determining whether or not production will be forthcoming. If a prospective con-
tractor cannot perform by reason of labor disputes, obviously he cannot be awarded
a contract. There is nothing magic about labor disputes in this regard. Anything
that renders a prospective contractor unable to perform must disqualify him. 7 It
would be an act of gross irresponsibility to award contracts that would not be per-
formed. The fact that a prospective contractor is currently undergoing a strike
does not, however, establish that he is unable to perform. The strike may not be
effective, and the company may consequently be able to perform. Whatever the
desirability of dealing with struck firms from a labor policy point of view, the
critical question of performance must be answered. Production not labor policy
is the interest of procurement. Cost not labor policy is the command of the
Comptroller General.
Once a contract has been awarded, a strike raises a number of considerations.
Three basic problems are involved. First, it must be determined whether or not
made pursuant to Act of Aug. 28, 1958, 72 Star. 972, 50 U.S.C. § 1431 (1958) as implemented by
Exec. Order No. 10789, 23 Fed. Reg. 8897 (1958). The essential ingredient of these determinations is
that the action taken was "determined necessary in order to facilitate the national defense." Dctermina-
tions were made by the Deputy Secretary of Defense Sept. 2x, x962, and the Administrator of NASA,
Sept. 26, 1962 for Cape Kennedy, and by the Administrator of NASA Sept. 26, 1963 for the Mississippi
Test Facility.
05 42 Stat. 25 (1921), 31 U.S.C. § 53 (1958).
" Rulings of the Comptroller General have prohibited contracting agencies from requiring as a
condition of a government contract that the contractor comply with the National Labor Relations Act
(2o DEcs. Comsp. GEN. 14 (1940)) or with the Fair Labor Standards Act (2o DEcs. CoMlP. GEN. 24
(1940)), and from rejecting a bid to avoid possible labor difficulties solely on the ground that the low
bidder might not employ union labor (31 DEcs. Comp,. GEM 561 (1952)).
"See ASPR § I, part 9, 32 C.F.R. 1.900-1.907 (1961), which broadly deals with the responsibility
of prospective contractors.
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the contractor can continue or, in some cases, even begin, performance. If not, the
contract can be terminated and the work transferred to another contractor s Just
as it would be irresponsible to award a contract to a contractor who could not
perform, so is it improper to leave a contract once awarded in the hands of a
contractor who will not perform. If the contractor is able to continue performing
despite the strike, or if after a period of nonproduction he resumes performance, the
problem next becomes one of whether to grant an extension of time by reason of
excusable delay or penalize the contractor for any,failure to meet the established
schedule. 9 The resolution of this question involves determination of whether or not
the contractor could have foreseen the strike and whether or not he took all legal
steps within his power to end itY3 Foreseeability is a particularly important issue
when a contractor is delayed by a strike against some other firm. In any event,
these determinations are made on a detached basis of reasonable business prudence.
Compliance with the Taft-Hartley Act is not separately viewed in this process.
Resolution of this ordinarily much contested question could not possibly be achieved
by the National Labor Relations Board-the agency to whose expertise the area is
committed-in time to serve as a basis of the contracting decision. A patent viola-
tion manifestly causing a strike of course would be inconsistent with an objective
standard of reasonable business prudence. But these matters rarely loom so clear
and the administrative impossibility of awaiting an authoritative decision effectively
means that the Taft-Hartley Act, like the Wagner Act and the War Department, is
not enforced by the Department of Defense.
The third basic problem when a contractor undergoes a strike arises with cost-type
contracts. Surrounded with difficulties of definition, that question, of course, is
whether and to what extent costs incurred during a strike will be reimbursed71
Strike costs, it is agreed, should not be awarded. But what is a strike cost? Ad-
vertising in the local newspapers to raise public sympathy for management's position
and criticism for labor's is, to be sure. So are the range of costs that a company
might incur to "beat" a strike. What of the higher overhead unit cost that is the
inevitable result of a decreased work force and decreased production? Plainly a com-
pany cannot be asked to move to a facility where the rent is lower while its pro-
of Termination may be either because of default on the part of the contractor or for the convenience
of the government depending upon the surrounding facts. If it is for default, the contractor is liable for
additional costs incurred in obtaining a replacement. If it is for convenience, the Defense Department must
make the contractor whole. ASPR § 8, 32 C.F.R. § 8 (ig6i). The question of whether the termination
should be for default or convenience is similar to the question involved in determining excusable delay
discussed in the succeeding text.
"5 The contract may contain provisions for liquidated damages for delays, other than those which
arise out of unforeseeable causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the contractor.
E.g., ASPR 8-709, 32 C.F.R. § 8.709 (1963). In addition, the question of default by reason of not
meeting the schedule may arise.
o ASPR 12-101.2, 32 C.F.R. § 12.101-2 (1963).
11 A similar question may arise in redetermination of fixed price contracts (ASPR 3-404.5-3-404.7, 32
C.F.R. § 3.404-5-3.404.7 (1963)) in which provision is made for limited adjustment of the contract price
during or after performance. The cost principles applied to cost type contracts are used in evaluating such
adjustment (ASPR 15-Io6, 32 C.F.R. § 15.106 (i96I)).
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duction is diminished by a strike. Between these extremes lies a very large area of
costs that are difficult to define.2 The process of definition, just as the determina-
tion of excusable delay, turns on an objective standard of reasonable business pru-
denceP7
This determination, like cost allowability of labor standards and practices, inheres
in the contracting authority. So do the issues of excusable delay and capacity to
perform. Responsibility for contracting carries with it the necessity to resolve these
questions. They are constituent parts of the contracting function.
Beyond this, the interest in obtaining production is subserved by maintaining
the closest relationships with the civilian agencies, constantly evaluating the defense
impact of any labor dispute, and generally insuring that important disputes receive
necessary attention. Occasionally, in particularly critical and rare cases, the Depart-
ment will effect the removal of needed products from a struck plant.1 4  But the
resolution of labor disputes to assure continued production is left to the civilian
agencies. The effectiveness of their response makes the basic philosophy consistent
with the defense mission.
III
LABOR SUPPLY
Essential work cannot be accomplished without workers. Labor is indispensable
to production. The availability of sufficient workers-the extent of labor supply-
can accordingly be a most serious matter for the Department of Defense. Like
labor standards and labor disputes, labor supply may trigger the critical interest in
production.
The labor supply problems felt by the National Harness and Saddlery Commis-
sion in World War I were greatly magnified during World War II. Labor supply
became an issue affecting all industries, pervading the economy.
One industry after another requested the release of military personnel to perform
civilian services that were otherwise unavailable. Men were released to work in mines
producing nonferrous metals, particularly copper, to work in the aircraft industry,
the tire industry, and the forge and foundry industry-all by transfer from active duty
to the Enlisted Reserve Corps. Temporary releases of men were effected for food
canning, farm equipment repair, and-repeatedly-for agriculture. Former seamen
were allowed to apply for discharge to return to the merchant marine. Ninety day
furloughs were granted for personnel to work in cotton duck and heavy ammunition
and to augment the manpower already made available by release for tires and forge
The problem is complicated further by the existence of a variety of contract types. In a firm, fixed-
price contract, the contractor must absorb all costs. In a cost reimbursement contract, the government
must bear all reasonable costs. Between these two are incentive contracts which place an outer limit on
the costs contractors may be reimbursed. See ASPR § 3, part 4, 32 C.F.R. §§ 3.400-3.406-3 (i96i), for
the various types of contracts and their implications.73 ASPR 15-201.3, 32 C.F.R. § i5.2Oi-3 (1961).
7' Department of Defense Directive No. 1135.1, Removal of Items from Facilities Affected by a Work
Stoppage, March 22, x95 i .
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and foundry. With the exception of forge and foundry, these industrial furloughs
were later extended an additional thirty days. Both release and furlough were
utilized to provide workers for the railroads. Although the number of military
personnel thus made available to industry was never very large, the criticality of the
labor supply problem is highlighted by the fact that they were released.75
Discrimination against Negroes aggravated the problems of labor supply, but
as the war progressed, their employment opportunities in war industry were dra-
matically increased. Bolstered by an executive order forbidding discrimination by
reason of race, creed, color or national origin, and requiring contract clauses to
that effect, Negro employment in war industry more than doubled from 1942 to
I945.v° As discrimination was diminished, the supply of workers was, of course,
enhanced. Quite apart from the compelling moral considerations, discrimination
was-as it must be-a senseless waste of our vital manpower resources.
Another and even larger source of labor supply was women. Vigorous efforts were
made to bring women out of the home and into war industry. Interestingly enough,
these recruitment efforts for industry had their moments of conflict with those for
the Women's Army Corps.
Workers from nearby countries were also utilized to ease the labor shortage,
mostly in agriculture, but also in industry. From Mexico, the Bahamas, Jamaica
and the British West Indies, labor emigrated to supplement the United States man-
power resources.
Prisoners of war were put to work, within the bounds of the Geneva Con-
vention. 77  Agriculture was the most extensive, though not exclusive, area of their
use.
Whatever industries the various sources of reinforcement to our industrial man-
power serviced, they provided a mobile reserve. As such, they allowed work to be
done or crops to be harvested when the need arose. And if they did not work in
war industry, they satisfied labor demands that otherwise would have competed
with it.
As labor supply became a critical issue, a special civilian agency-the War Man-
power Commission-was created by the PresidentY Addressing itself to the prob-
lems of allocating the available manpower, the Commission broadly regulated the
field, seeking to alleviate the labor shortages that continually developed and mag-
nified. Its efforts ranged from the imposition of manpower ceilings to free workers
from plants where they could be spared to "freeze" orders precluding the transfer
of workers from one job to another without a certificate of availability issued by the
United States Employment Service.Y9
71 See generally FAIRCmLD & GROSSMAN, op. cit. supra note 26, ch. 8.
"'Exec. Order No. 88o2, 6 Fed. Reg. 3201 (1941).
" Under the Convention only privates could be required to work. Moreover, prisoners of war could
not be used to perform work which was unhealthful, dangerous or directly related to war operations.
Geneva Convention Relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, of July 27, 1929, 118 L.N.T.S. 343
(1932).
18 Exec. Order No. 9139, 7 Fed. Reg. 2919 (1942).
See SEIDMoAN, op. cit. supra note 52, c. 9.
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The War Department also took direct action. From the beginning, efforts were
made to locate new facilities in areas in which labor would be available. With the
build-up necessitated by the war in Europe and ultimately the World War, plants and
airfields had to be constructed. Powder plants, small arms plants, aircraft factories-
a wide range of additional capacity was needed. Prior to the attack on Pearl
Harbor, efforts to locate with a view to labor supply met with some success. Follow-
ing the attack, the rush to begin new construction precluded labor supply from
receiving much consideration. But by the summer of 1943, when labor shortages were
being felt, labor supply was firmly established as a major factor in the decision on
locating new or expanded facilitiesYs By this time also, the conflicting restrictions
inherent in a pattern of production had similarly developed. Technical skills were
discretely located. Contractors had demonstrated their capacity to perform. Ques-
tions of locating expanded facilities were easily as intimately tied up with these con-
siderations as with labor supply. Technical skills and proven capacity to perform,
moreover, were more immediately visible to contracting officers whose first attention
had to be addressed to meeting requirements. Even with available labor, an un-
proven contractor away from technical skills might have experienced difficulty
in performing. In any event, by the time labor supply became an established factor
in the location of facilities, the list of areas which did not have a labor problem had
so shrunk that the range of alternatives was relatively narrow. As labor supply
became an increasingly pressing problem, the capability of the War Department to
respond through location of facilities was thus proportionately diminished.
Perhaps the most intensive efforts made by the War Department to resolve
problems of labor supply were the special project teams. In early 1943, a critical
aircraft manufacturer notified the President that it could not meet its production
schedule by summer unless its labor force was increased. By summer, the company
was behind schedule. This loss of critical production gave birth to the first special
project team, consisting of two men who were dispatched to the company's plant.
The team made every effort to attract new workers and to reduce turnover, which
had been extreme. It obtained an order of the War Labor Board increasing the
company's wage rates which were not competitive. It worked to improve housing
in the area and public transportation to and from work. It arranged for the company
to pay the child care fees of its employees and for Army reimbursement of this
cost. It brought about fundamental changes in the relations between the company
and its employees which it found "extremely bad."'" At the team's urging, the
company assigned its representative on the grievance board to other work, employed
a labor relations executive with authority to establish labor policies, and discon-
tinued a practice that had been a great source of employee resentment. The union
was urged to set aside old antagonisms and concentrate on the importance of
aircraft production. Previously characteristic inflammatory attacks on the company
So FAIRCMu, & GROSSMAN, op. cit. supra note 26, at o5.
"
1 Id. at 137.
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disappeared from the union newspaper and were replaced by appeals for increased
production. The team spoke to community leaders and public newspapers to
bring about a more favorable view of the company. Special morale programs were
planned for the community as well as the plant.
These actions of the initial team were repeated with great similarity by a total
of sixteen others. Of the seventeen special project teams, two, including the first,
were designed for a single company, four were concerned with a single area, and
eleven dealt with the problems of an entire industry. As their scope ranged, so did
their size-from one to forty-five.
Currently, the Department of Defense is much involved in the field of non-
discrimination. The President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity
functions within a charter greatly expanded beyond the original executive order of
World War IIYs Constituting as it does the major source of government contracts,
the Department of Defense is very active in working with the Committee to the
end of insuring equal opportunity for employees and prospective employees of its
contractors. In addition, the President's Commission on the Status of Women has
recommended that nondiscrimination by reason of sex be advanced through govern-
ment contracts.83 The work of this Commission is being continued and intensified
by a new Interdepartmental Committee, on which the Secretary of Defense serves,
and a Citizens' Advisory Council.!' The Committee and the Council are concerned,
as is the Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, with employment oppor-
tunities within and without government. Their interest ranges more broadly,
however, over the host of considerations involved in the status of women.8 5
Currently, also, the nation is experiencing an unemployment problem. National
attention is importantly focused on finding work.
By the same token, community attention may be focused on the viability of cur-
rent defense work. Where defense contracts are the main business of local industry,
or a military installation is a major local employer, workers who look to defense
for job security and companies which do likewise for profits are joined by com-
munities concerned with their general economic health. Cancellation of contracts
or inactivation of installations may raise serious community problems. Aware of
this potential result of decisions which must be based on considerations of how best
to perform the defense mission, the Department of Defense has established an Office
of Economic Adjustment, charged with responsibility to work with communities
to ease the impact, to help the communities in the development and execution of
programs to compensate for the loss of defense work.!'
s See note i6 supra.
83 Established by Exec. Order No. o98o, on Dec. 14, x961, 26 Fed. Reg. 12059 (1961), the Commis-
sion filed its report to the President on Oct. 1i, 1963.
84 Exec. Order No. 11030, 29 Fed. Reg. 5847 (1962).
" Discrimination on the basis of age has similarly been proscribed. A presidential memorandum of
March 14, 1963, asserts the policy against age discrimination in federal employment and Executive
Order No. 11141, Feb. 12, 1964, extends it to the employment of government contractors.
8 Department of Defense Directive No. 5410.12, Policies and Procedures for Minimizing Economic
Impact on Communities Resulting from Adjustments in Defense Programs, Oct. 2o, 1961.
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The Department of Defense also remains concerned, as was the War Department
in World War II, with the placement of contracts in areas with substantial un-
employment. During World War II, efforts were made to place contracts, like
facilities, with a view to labor supply. While these efforts were extensive, and
resulted in considerable success, the ultimate factor in contract awards, again like
facilities, was production. Contracts had to be awarded to firms that would deliver
the essential production. Today, Defense Manpower Policy No. 4 serves to "en-
courage the placement of contracts and facilities in areas of persistent or substantial
labor surplus," but its efficacy is restricted by an express prohibition against payment
of a price differential 87 And the paramount need to obtain the product-enhanced
by the overwhelming complexity of much of the current military procurement-
understandably provides a further restriction. With skill and capacity so exactly
required, little room is left for locational considerations in seeking production of an
intricate weapons system, for example. Performance of the contract, let in further-
ance of the mission, measures the defense response to labor supply as well as labor
disputes or labor standards.
CONCLUSION
Within a basic philosophy of leaving labor policy to the civilian agencies, the
defense response to particular labor problems has in the course of time been active
and direct. From the complete control over wages and hours of the National
Harness and Saddlery Adjustment Commission, to the organization of the Loyal
Legion of Loggers and Lumbermen with the promulgation of a charter of working
conditions, to the special project teams which plunged into industrial practices and
community attitudes, Defense has vigorously participated in a field it philosophically
-with equal vigor-eschews.
National urgency may vary from hot war to cold war to peace; urgency for the
Department of Defense is a function of the need for the product and the efficacy of the
civilian response to the particular labor problem that threatens production. As
problem areas are diminished by legislation establishing a framework for resolution,
the range of potential Defense action continually narrows. As the civilian agencies,
established and special, effectively perform within the framework Congress provides,
87 32A C.F.R. App. at 35 (x963). The original Defense Manpower Policy No. 4 allowed payment of
a price differential. 17 Fed. Reg. 1195 (1952). Riders attached to Defense appropriations overruled this
aspect of the policy, and it was accordingly changed to include the express prohibition. The basis
of Defense Manpower Policy No. 4 has also undergone some change. Originally, it sounded mostly in
mobilization: "The conversion from civilian to military production, unless carefully coordinated, would
result in dislocations causing serious waste of manpower and facilities in many areas, and thereby re-
ducing our defense potential. The overriding need is to obtain on schedule the goods and services
required for defense. In achieving this goal, every effort must be made to hold to a minimum any waste
of manpower which may result from materials shortages and conversion to defense production." It now
has been broadened to look beyond mobilization to "economic balance" and "employment stability":
"When large numbers of workers move to already tight areas, heavy burdens are placed on community
facilities-schools, hospitals, housing, transportation, utilities, and so forth. On the other hand, when
unemployment develops in certain areas, unemployment compensation costs increase and plants, tools,
and workers' skills remain idle and unable to contribute to our defense programs."
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the need for Defense action similarly dwindles. Bordered by a decreased range and
need, the capacity for Defense action also lessens. The steadily magnifying complexity
of military procurement reduces the number of potential contractors able to meet
the exacting requirements and, concomitantly, flexibility in selection among com-
petitors.
Beyond such matters as cost allowability and excusable delay which must attend
the contracting process, the defense response has always been dictated by its mission.
The contract is let in furtherance of that mission. The criticality of performance
is measured by it. When the defense of the nation is involved, when national security
demands, Defense responds to problems of labor policy definitively.
The basic philosophy of leaving labor policy to the civilian agencies stands. Its
desirability is buttressed by their effectiveness. Fulfillment of the Defense mission,
however, is the ultimate commitment.
